The experience of the winter of 2025–2026 revealed two things. First, investment in alternative energy sources and the installation of cogeneration capacity have now become mainstream, rather than a niche. Second, while the winter of 2025–2026 did not translate directly into a political crisis for the Ukrainian leadership, the coming winter will carry direct political consequences for those who took the lessons of that season too lightly.
Over the course of four years of the full-scale Russian invasion, Ukraine has experienced regular attacks on its civilian energy infrastructure. Russia’s tactics in striking such infrastructure have been continuously evolving. Throughout 2022–2023, the Kremlin attempted to disconnect the Ukrainian energy system by targeting electricity grids that could be repaired relatively easily. The main purpose was to trigger short-term blackouts to undermine public morale and pressure the political leadership into capitulation. This tactic was comparatively restrained – avoiding the destruction of energy-generating capacity – likely in the hope that Ukraine would surrender quickly, and that little would need to be spent on rebuilding damaged infrastructure. By 2024, however, the tactics had changed, and Russia began systematically targeting and destroying components of Ukraine’s energy system, apparently abandoning any expectation that the war could be won as easily as initially anticipated.
In 2021, Ukraine had 38 GW of energy-generating capacity. By mid-2024, official reports showed that less than a third of that remained functional – just 12 GW. Substantial restoration work has been carried out since then, and ahead of the 2025–2026 heating season, an estimated 17.6 GW were reportedly back in service.
The winter of 2025–2026 proved to be the harshest since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. According to Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal, following last winter’s strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, the country was left with less than 10 GW of generating capacity, while winter demand can reach as high as 18 GW. Ukraine can import up to 2 GW from the EU to offset this shortfall, but the remainder must be managed through rolling blackouts.
Increasing hours of daylight improve the situation somewhat; consumption falls and solar generation contributes to supply. At the time of writing, officials report a deficit of only 1 GW during periods without active air strikes. Restoring the generating capacity damaged over the past winter will cost Ukraine an estimated USD 1 billion, according to Minister Shmyhal.
When Russia began its intensive campaign of destroying energy infrastructure, the Ukrainian leadership bet on nuclear power plants (NPPs) remaining untouched, since targeting them would constitute a clear red line for world leaders. Russia focused instead on destroying the so-called manoeuvring capacity – the assets that balance the energy system during peak demand hours. Initially, the approach of relying on NPP output supplemented by EU electricity imports worked reasonably well. Investment in alternative energy sources such as solar panels and distributed cogeneration was encouraged, but was taken up primarily by those more aware of the threat, such as businesses and residential associations preparing for upcoming disruptions.
During the winter of 2025–2026, however, Russian tactics shifted once again, this time compounded by the exceptionally severe cold. Whereas Russia had previously launched nationwide attacks to disperse Ukrainian air defences, it now did the opposite – concentrating massive missile and drone strikes on single locations, overwhelming local air defence systems. Russia thereby succeeded in triggering energy system collapses in major cities, including Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv and Kyiv. Russia also effectively severed the NPPs from the national grid, undermining the assumption that nuclear plants would be spared. The plants themselves remained intact, but Russia destroyed the costly transmission equipment connecting them to consumers – equipment that is both expensive and time-consuming to replace.
The experience of the winter of 2025–2026 revealed two things. First, investment in alternative energy sources and the installation of cogeneration capacity have now become mainstream, rather than a niche appealing only to the more aware. At every level – from local communities to the central government – significant efforts are being made to use the precious time before the next heating season wisely. Second, while the winter of 2025–2026 did not yet translate into a direct political crisis for Ukraine’s leadership, despite the enormous hardships endured by people in the affected cities, the coming winter will carry direct political consequences for those who took the lessons of 2025–2026 too lightly.
Dmytro Boyarchuk – is a Ukrainian economist and an expert on fiscal policy and macroeconomic analysis; until recently the executive director of the Ukrainian think tank CASE Ukraine, and since September 2025 a senior expert at the Warsaw-based CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research. He has been a member of TEP since February 2026.
