By Adam Ujazdowski. Polish original published on 8 November 2026 at 13:06 UTC. English edition published on 8 November 2026.
China became the largest producer by value added in 14 of 18 manufacturing industries in 2024, having led none in 2000, according to the OECD. Its shares approached half of global output by this measure in textiles, non-metallic mineral products and non-ferrous metals. The findings show how Chinese inputs reach overseas businesses through supply chains that direct import figures cannot fully capture.
Nearly half of value added in three industries
The OECD’s Economic security in global production: Dependencies and vulnerabilities in GVCs, published on 6 November 2026, examines the shift over 24 years. Measured by gross output, China ranked first in 17 of the 18 manufacturing industries in 2024; coke and refined petroleum products were the sole exception.
China’s share of global value added rose from 13% to 47% in textiles and clothing, from 10% to 47% in other non-metallic mineral products, and from 8% to 45% in non-ferrous metals. Its share increased from 12% to 42% in iron and steel and from 9% to 37% in electrical equipment.
Share by industry, %
Source: OECD, Economic security in global production: Dependencies and vulnerabilities in GVCs, 2026.
The second-largest producer in each of these five industries accounted for just 6–12% of global value added in 2024. The European Union’s member states combined held shares of 7–19%, showing that China’s lead extends across several categories of production.
Chinese inputs also arrive through third countries
China was the largest foreign supplier of value added in about 40% of the economy–sector relationships analysed in 2024, compared with around 4% in 2000. In more than half of the relationships where it ranked first, its contribution was at least twice that of the second-largest supplier.
Share of relationships, %
Source: OECD, Economic security in global production: Dependencies and vulnerabilities in GVCs, 2026.
China’s share of the foreign value added embedded in global exports rose from 3% in 2000 to 11% in 2024. Materials and components made in China may be processed by companies in third countries before a finished product reaches its final buyer.
Chinese value added accounted for 15.6% of Vietnam’s total exports and 14.5% of Cambodia’s in 2024, up from 2.8% and 1.5%, respectively, in 2000. The country shipping a finished product is therefore not necessarily where its components were made.
Industries in which China ranked first by value added
Source: OECD, Economic security in global production: Dependencies and vulnerabilities in GVCs, 2026.
Value added, gross output and exports measure different things
Value added measures the value created within an economy after subtracting the cost of materials, energy and other intermediate inputs used in production. Gross output includes the full value of products, including inputs bought from other businesses. Exports measure goods and services sold abroad, including products containing foreign components.
A large exporter of finished equipment need not manufacture every component itself. Conversely, a producer of steel, electronics or raw materials can contribute substantially to another country’s exports without selling the finished product directly in its destination market. The OECD’s Inter-Country Input-Output database, known as ICIO, traces these links between economies and industries.
All 79 economies rely more on China than China does on them
All 79 economies in the OECD comparison depended more on Chinese manufacturing value added in 2024 than China depended on theirs. The average gap was 21 percentage points. In 2000, the relationship ran in the opposite direction for the United States, Japan, Germany, Korea, France and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN.
Among the economy–sector relationships in which China became the leading supplier between 2000 and 2024, the United States lost first place in 450 cases, Japan in 289 and Germany in 198. These counts describe changes in the structure of global production, rather than numbers of factory closures.
Poland imports almost PLN 250 billion in Chinese goods
Poland imported PLN 246.5 billion in goods from China in 2025, equivalent to 15.5% of its goods imports, according to Statistics Poland, the national statistics office known domestically as GUS. Exports to China totalled PLN 13.2 billion, leaving a bilateral trade deficit of PLN 233.3 billion. These are goods-trade figures, not estimates of Chinese value added in Polish production.
Machinery, electrical equipment, metals and other production materials are important inputs for Polish businesses. Some Chinese components may reach Poland after processing in Germany, Czechia or other countries. Direct import statistics do not reveal the entire supply chain in such cases.
The ICIO database allows these links to be analysed for Poland and other economies. The public 2025 edition of the OECD’s Trade in Value Added indicators, or TiVA, provides detailed data through 2022, while the November report presents global findings extending to 2024. Comparisons must account for differences in coverage and methodology.
Dependence does not automatically mean vulnerability
The OECD cautions that concentrated production and reliance on overseas suppliers do not necessarily make an economy vulnerable to disruption. The availability of alternative suppliers, the ease of substituting a component and the cost of downtime all matter. International production networks also bring benefits through specialisation, lower costs and access to technology.
The report recommends closer examination of direct and indirect dependencies, particularly where suppliers cannot quickly be replaced. It calls for proportionate policy responses that balance supply-chain resilience with the benefits of open trade. The study primarily documents statistical changes; it does not forecast a breakdown of globalisation.
Data sources: OECD, Economic security in global production: Dependencies and vulnerabilities in GVCs, OECD Policy Briefs No. 74, 6 November 2026; OECD ICIO; Statistics Poland.
Photo: Horst J. Meuter / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.
