European Union gas storage was just 71.6% full at the end of September 2026, its lowest reading for that month since comparable records began in 2011 and about 11 percentage points below a year earlier. By November 18, stocks had declined to 69.8%, according to Gas Infrastructure Europe data. A new Federal Reserve research note suggests Europe can get through an average winter without running out of gas, but a substantial disruption to liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports could leave storage close to empty by spring.
Europe starts winter with a thinner gas buffer
Johannes Fleck, an economist at the Federal Reserve Board, examined Europe’s gas balance for the winter of 2026–27 in a FEDS Notes paper published on November 20. His scenarios model inventories through June 2027, drawing on domestic production, consumption and imports. They are conditional research projections, not an official Federal Reserve policy forecast.
The starting position is considerably weaker than in recent winters. EU storage was about 72% full in late September, with Germany at just 58%. The latest reported figures for November 18 put the EU-wide level at 69.8%, equivalent to roughly 791 terawatt-hours (TWh), while Germany stood at 57.2%. The EU total is an aggregate of stored gas relative to working capacity, not an average of national percentages.
Low inventories mean that Europe has less room to absorb prolonged cold weather or interruptions to incoming supply. Stocks normally decline as heating demand rises, so the amount of gas arriving by pipeline and LNG tanker during the winter can be as important as the level held in storage at the start of the season.
Russia’s retreat has transformed Europe’s gas supply
The EU imported approximately 158 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas from Russia in 2021, equal to 44% of its imports from outside the bloc. By 2025, Russian deliveries had fallen to 40 bcm, or 13%. Norway became the EU’s largest external supplier, while domestic EU production declined by roughly 13 bcm over the same period, largely as the Groningen field in the Netherlands was wound down and closed.
LNG has filled a substantial part of the gap. EU LNG imports rose from 80 bcm in 2021 to 146 bcm in 2025, an increase of more than 80%, and accounted for 46% of imports from outside the bloc. Roughly three-quarters of the growth in LNG imports came from the United States, which supplied around half of the EU’s LNG in 2025.
The adjustment has reduced reliance on Russian pipelines but increased exposure to internationally traded LNG. Imports from outside the EU were only about 1% lower year on year in the first seven months of 2026, despite disruption in Middle Eastern energy markets. LNG still made up about 45% of overall imports during that period.
Competition with Asia is the key LNG risk
Around one-fifth of the world’s LNG normally passes through the Strait of Hormuz, much of it destined for Asia. Qatar accounted for about 9% of EU LNG imports in 2025 and 6% in the first seven months of 2026. Those relatively modest direct shares do not fully capture Europe’s vulnerability to interruptions in Qatari exports.
When Asian buyers lose access to Qatari cargoes, they can compete with European buyers for alternative shipments from Atlantic producers, including the United States. This competition may tighten availability and raise prices even where Europe’s direct exposure to Gulf exports is limited. Unlike pipeline gas tied to fixed infrastructure, LNG cargoes can be diverted between markets, subject to contracts, shipping capacity and terminal access.
Europe’s wholesale gas market has already felt the strain. Fleck reports that the average Dutch TTF front-month price rose to roughly €76 per megawatt-hour in September 2026, from €32 a year earlier, with prices reaching €84 during the month. The note links the tighter market to the disruption of LNG shipments from Qatar through Hormuz.
Lower consumption provides some protection
EU natural gas consumption declined from 413 bcm in 2021 to 332 bcm in 2024, a fall of almost 20%. Households, industry, power generation and services all contributed. Demand increased slightly in 2025, largely because gas-fired power generation rose, and was approximately 1% higher in January–July 2026 than a year earlier. Even so, it remained 19% below the same period in 2021.
Some of the reduction reflects milder winters. But after adjusting for temperature, Fleck estimates that consumption was still about 15% below its pre-crisis relationship with weather during 2023–25. Lower underlying demand has improved Europe’s supply balance, though it does not eliminate the risks associated with LNG availability.
Baseline: 30% of capacity left at the end of March
Fleck’s baseline begins with an estimated 80 bcm in storage at the end of September 2026. It assumes domestic production and imports in each month match the corresponding month a year earlier, while consumption follows the average for that month across the four winters from 2022–23 through 2025–26.
Under these assumptions, stored volumes peak at about 84 bcm in October, compared with roughly 99 bcm on the recent historical-average path, before falling to about 32 bcm by the end of March 2027. That would equal 30% of the storage capacity used in the model. Inventories would be lower than the troughs in the previous two winters, but above the 20% level to which European countries have previously allowed stocks to fall.
This is not a prediction of a gas shortage. It is a calculation showing that, if supply remains consistent with the baseline assumptions and consumption follows the recent seasonal average, the EU would finish the heating season with a material reserve.
A harsh winter would cut stocks to 15%
The second scenario keeps baseline supply assumptions but uses the highest monthly gas consumption observed in the four most recent winters. In this case, storage falls to approximately 16 bcm, or 15% of capacity, by the end of March 2027, remaining below 20% from February through April.
That would leave little room for additional supply shocks. It would also be below the minimum of 17.7% recorded in March–April 2018, the only period since 2011 in which EU storage fell below 20%, according to the historical comparison cited in the note. The scenario nevertheless does not project complete exhaustion of gas inventories.
A one-third LNG cut is the most severe scenario
The third scenario, labelled ‘Import Scarcity’, is deliberately more pessimistic. It holds pipeline imports, exports and gas consumption at baseline levels while reducing monthly LNG imports by one-third from a year earlier. Across October–March, that would mean approximately 51 bcm of LNG arriving instead of the 77 bcm received in the comparable previous period.
In this scenario, the reduction of about 26 bcm in LNG availability drives stocks to just 6% of capacity in April 2027. Inventories would remain below 20% through June, leaving the EU with a particularly difficult refill season ahead of winter 2027–28. The scenario combines an assumed severe disruption to LNG supply through the Strait of Hormuz with reduced deliveries from other established exporters.
The paper also tests different degrees of LNG scarcity. At 80% of the previous year’s LNG volumes, inventories would bottom out near the harsh-winter path. At 70%, stocks fall to roughly 9 bcm; at 60%, storage is almost empty by April. Each additional 10-percentage-point reduction beyond a one-fifth LNG shortfall removes about another 8 bcm from the seasonal trough, according to the model.
These outcomes should not be read as the Fed forecasting an inevitable collapse in Europe’s gas supplies. The critical outcome depends on a sustained, substantial reduction in LNG imports, with no offset from other supply sources or changes in consumption.
El Niño could ease demand, but cold snaps remain possible
Fleck also considers whether a very strong El Niño could improve Europe’s gas balance. Across five strong El Niño winters since 1980, EU heating-degree days weighted by gas consumption averaged about 6% below trend. A winter that mild could reduce non-power gas demand by about 4 bcm, although the additional saving relative to the already mild winters used in the baseline would be only around 2.5 bcm.
The sample is small, and El Niño does not rule out episodes of severe European cold. The potential weather benefit therefore provides only a limited cushion against LNG shortages or a prolonged period of high heating demand.
The refill challenge extends into 2027–28
All three modeled paths would leave the EU beginning its 2027 storage-refilling season with less gas than at the same point in 2026. The import-scarcity scenario is particularly demanding because almost empty stores would require substantial additional supplies even after winter demand subsides.
One methodological distinction matters when comparing the projections with daily GIE readings. Fleck’s inventory model uses Eurostat’s definition of stocks held by EU member states, including gas held abroad, and assumes an EU storage capacity of about 107 bcm. It is not identical to the capacity and inventory aggregates published by GIE AGSI+, so the two sets of percentages should not be treated as directly interchangeable.
Sources
- Johannes Fleck, Europe’s Natural Gas Outlook for the Upcoming Winter 2026/2027, Federal Reserve Board, FEDS Notes, November 20, 2026: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/europes-natural-gas-outlook-for-the-upcoming-winter-2026-2027-20261120.html
- Gas Infrastructure Europe, AGSI+, EU storage data for gas day November 18, 2026: https://agsi.gie.eu/
- Eurostat, gas balance and import statistics cited in the Federal Reserve research note (nrg_cb_gasm, nrg_ti_gasm, nrg_bal_c).
