Foreign Supply Chains Are Becoming More Closely Linked to Inflation, Fed Research Finds

Delays at overseas suppliers have become much more closely associated with domestic inflation since 2023, according to new Federal Reserve research covering 15 economies. The relationship is especially pronounced for producer prices, suggesting that strains in international production networks are increasingly relevant to inflation beyond what domestic demand alone can explain.

The analysis, published on November 20, 2026, in the Federal Reserve Board’s FEDS Notes series, examines whether the economic links created by global supply chains have strengthened in recent years. François de Soyres compares the period before 2020 with observations from 2023 onward, controlling for domestic economic slack, oil prices and previous inflation.

For producer prices, the estimated coefficient linking foreign supplier delays to annual inflation increased from 0.035 before 2020 to 0.449 since 2023. The corresponding coefficients for the study’s consumer-price measure rose from 0.006 to 0.080. The increases are statistically significant in both cases, but the coefficients describe associations in a model, not observed increases in inflation or proof of causality.

Foreign bottlenecks now track inflation more closely

The inflation analysis covers Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Poland is not included. Quarterly inflation data run through the second quarter of 2026.

Rather than relying entirely on one global index of supply-chain disruption, de Soyres constructs a separate measure of foreign delivery pressures for each economy. It combines manufacturing supplier delivery-time indicators from trading partners, weighted by their shares in that economy’s imports of intermediate inputs.

The distinction matters because countries depend on different suppliers. A bottleneck in a major source of industrial components may have a greater bearing on prices in economies heavily reliant on that source than in countries buying most of their inputs elsewhere.

The research finds a positive relationship between foreign delivery times and both producer and consumer inflation. The relationship is substantially stronger after 2022 and is particularly pronounced in producer prices, which are more directly exposed to the cost and availability of materials and parts.

Producer prices show a larger association than consumer prices

A separate set of estimates examines delivery times reported by suppliers within each economy. Across the full sample, a one-standard-deviation increase in that indicator—approximately 6.7 index points—is associated with annual consumer-price inflation 0.19 percentage point higher and producer-price inflation 0.82 percentage point higher.

For comparison, a one-standard-deviation increase in the output gap, approximately 2.7 percentage points, is associated with consumer-price inflation 0.11 percentage point higher and producer-price inflation 0.13 percentage point higher. These are model-based comparisons for specified changes in explanatory variables, not inflation readings for November 2026. They refer to domestic supplier delivery times, not the separately estimated foreign index.

There is an economic reason for the difference between factory-gate and consumer prices. Manufacturers that rely on imported inputs may face higher procurement costs or production delays when foreign supplies become less readily available. Some of those costs can reach producer prices before they are fully, or even partly, passed on to consumers.

The extent and timing of any pass-through depend on firms’ margins, competitive conditions and pricing decisions. The regression results are consistent with such a transmission channel, but they do not establish how much inflation was directly caused by foreign supply disruptions.

How the Federal Reserve study measures supply-chain pressure

The research extends a standard Phillips curve framework by including supplier delivery times alongside the output gap, lagged inflation and current and lagged changes in oil prices. It uses quarterly panel regressions with country fixed effects, estimated separately for consumer and producer prices.

Delivery times are derived from manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) surveys, in which purchasing managers report whether suppliers are delivering more quickly or slowly than in the previous month. The indicator is adjusted so that higher readings indicate longer delivery times. The international exposure weights are drawn from OECD Inter-Country Input-Output tables, which trace the origins of intermediate inputs used in production.

The study labels its consumer-price specification CPI, but its underlying series is the OECD price index for private consumption—a consumption-deflator proxy rather than headline consumer price inflation. Producer inflation is measured using the producer price index (PPI).

The main before-and-after comparison excludes 2020–2022 because exceptional pandemic shocks affected economies simultaneously. Those years remain in the full-sample estimates. The foreign supplier weights are held at their 2022 values beyond that year, reflecting the latest available input-output data used in the exercise.

Longer delivery times can result from supply interruptions, strong demand or both. Consequently, the study identifies statistical relationships after controlling for several macroeconomic variables; it does not isolate an exogenous supply shock or demonstrate that delivery delays independently caused a particular change in inflation.

Country-specific supplier exposure adds information

De Soyres also compares the country-specific foreign delivery-time measure with the New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index. Both generally convey a similar message, but the country-specific measure fits movements in producer prices better in the period since 2023.

That suggests the geography of supply relationships matters for understanding domestic inflation. A common global measure captures widespread stress, but cannot distinguish how exposed individual economies are to the suppliers actually providing their production inputs.

The author cautions against reading the larger post-2022 coefficients as evidence that companies have stopped diversifying their suppliers. The regressions do not directly measure corporate sourcing decisions. The recent sample is also relatively short, and common global conditions may account for part of the estimated relationships.

Cross-border production is also linked to business cycles

A second part of the study investigates whether trade in intermediate inputs is related to the synchronization of economic activity. This broader analysis covers 26 economies and 325 country pairs, including Poland, but it does not produce a Poland-specific estimate for supply-chain delays and inflation.

Countries with stronger intermediate-input trade links generally exhibit more correlated GDP cycles. The estimated coefficient rises from 0.114 in windows ending before 2020 to 1.029 in the two latest windows, ending in 2023 and 2024. However, that apparent strengthening is less robust than the inflation findings.

When the pandemic years 2020–2022 are removed from the GDP-cycle calculations, the latest estimate falls to 0.890 and is no longer statistically significant. The result illustrates how the pandemic continues to complicate comparisons of cross-border economic activity.

China’s position in intermediate-input trade has expanded

The study also looks at the changing sources of imports. Across the 15 economies in the inflation sample, China’s average share of intermediate-input imports rose from 2.2% in 2000 to 10.4% in 2022. By 2022, China was the largest single source of such inputs for Australia, Brazil, Japan and South Korea.

Using UN Comtrade data on all goods imports—not just intermediate inputs—the author finds little overall shift in the concentration of supply sources between 2019 and 2025. In nine of the 13 economies with sufficiently complete 2025 data, the concentration index changed by less than 0.005 on a scale from zero to one.

China’s share of total imports increased in 10 of those 13 economies. The United States was a notable exception: China’s share roughly halved, while Mexico became the largest source of US goods imports.

The source of imports does not necessarily identify where goods were ultimately produced, particularly where production passes through several countries. Still, the trade data show why reliance on shared sources of industrial inputs can expose several economies to the same disruption—and why monitoring suppliers abroad can provide information that domestic economic indicators miss.

Source

Federal Reserve Board, François de Soyres, Increasing International Interdependence: Global Supply Chains and Cross-Border Macroeconomic Spillovers, FEDS Notes, November 20, 2026.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute financial or any other advice, is general in nature and is not addressed to any specific recipient. Before relying on this information for any purpose, independent advice should be sought. AI may support the editorial team’s work.

Selected categories