US Tariffs Cut Chinese Export Prices by 4.4% in Third Markets, Fed Study Finds

US tariffs introduced on Chinese goods in 2018–19 led to a 4.4% relative decline by 2021 in the unit prices of affected products sold to third-country markets, compared with Chinese goods not covered by the measures, according to a Federal Reserve Board study. In Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies, the gap reached roughly 12%, while the effect in the European Union was smaller and was no longer statistically significant by 2021. The analysis covers trade data from 69 economies over 2017–21.

By the Editorial Team. Adapted from the Polish original, published on 20 November 2026.

Chinese exports shifted after the United States imposed tariffs

Tariffs introduced by the Trump administration in 2018 and 2019 reduced Chinese producers’ access to the US market. Companies began directing more sales to other countries, often at lower prices. Economists describe this response as trade deflection.

Sofie Grouws, Giulia Lo Forte, Sharon Jeon and Justin Pierce examined the mechanism in a Federal Reserve Board paper. China accounted for more than 22% of US imports at the end of 2017, but its share had fallen to 13% by December 2024. At the same time, the value of Chinese exports to all destinations rose by more than 50% between 2017 and 2024.

The authors stress that these figures show a change in trade patterns but do not establish that US tariffs caused the entire increase in China’s global exports. Their empirical analysis focuses on the earlier 2017–21 period and asks how the new tariffs affected the prices of Chinese goods sold outside the United States.

Affected export prices fell by 4.4% relative to untariffed goods

The researchers used UN Comtrade import data for 69 economies. They compared price changes for Chinese products covered by the US tariffs with changes for Chinese products that were not subject to the new measures, while controlling for differences between products, suppliers, destination markets and years.

By 2021, the unit prices of tariff-affected products were 4.4% lower, on a relative basis, than those of comparable untariffed Chinese goods. The negative relationship was already visible in 2018 and remained statistically significant in subsequent years.

The 4.4% estimate does not mean that all Chinese imports became 4.4% cheaper or that inflation fell by that amount. It describes relative changes in the unit values of specified product groups. The study does not measure retail prices paid by consumers or the tariffs’ effect on an economy’s overall price level.

Lower prices were accompanied by greater import volumes. In 2019, the quantity of tariff-affected Chinese products imported by third markets was about 8% higher, relative to untariffed goods, after other factors were taken into account. That pattern is consistent with additional Chinese supply being redirected away from the United States.

The authors caution, however, that some differences in volume trends were present before the tariffs were imposed. The quantity estimates therefore require more careful interpretation than the price results, for which the researchers found no material divergence in earlier trends.

ASEAN recorded the largest price declines, while the EU effect faded

The strongest price response occurred in Southeast Asia. In ASEAN economies, the relative decline in the unit prices of tariff-affected Chinese goods was about 12% in both 2020 and 2021—almost three times the average estimated for the full sample.

The changes were much smaller in advanced economies. By 2021, the relative decline for that group was 2.2%, compared with 4.8% in emerging markets. ASEAN economies are included in the latter group and materially influenced its estimate.

In the European Union, the effect was shorter-lived. Researchers found statistically significant relative price declines of about 4% in 2019 and 5% in 2020. By 2021, the estimated gap had narrowed and was no longer statistically significant.

The 2021 data therefore do not confirm that the decline persisted in EU import prices, whereas the relationship remained pronounced in ASEAN through the end of the study period. The contrast suggests that Chinese exporters did not respond to the US tariffs in the same way across all markets.

Cheaper imports can lower costs for companies buying Chinese components, machinery or finished goods. Domestic producers competing with Chinese suppliers may instead face stronger price pressure. The study does not determine which group gained more or establish the ultimate welfare effect for individual economies.

Exporters cut prices more where additional sales were possible

The researchers examined why the reductions were larger in some destinations than in others. One factor was a product’s pre-tariff dependence on the US market: the greater the share of Chinese exports previously sold to the United States, the stronger the subsequent relative price decline in third countries.

Producers particularly exposed to the loss of US orders had a greater incentive to find alternative customers. Cutting prices could help them sell additional volumes without reducing production on the same scale.

The structure of competition also mattered. Chinese exporters cut prices more sharply in markets where imports of a given product had previously come from a relatively small number of supplier countries. Among destinations with highly concentrated sources of supply, the relative decline reached about 8% in 2021.

The authors suggest that limited competition may previously have allowed suppliers to earn higher margins, leaving more room to reduce them after the US tariffs were introduced. Price declines were also larger in markets where importers could more easily substitute goods from one country with those from another supplier.

Economic and political ties with China were associated with larger cuts

Geopolitical proximity to China was another significant factor. The researchers measured it using the similarity of countries’ voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly before the tariffs were imposed.

Countries closer to China by this measure recorded larger relative declines in the prices of Chinese imports. The relationship appeared among both advanced and emerging economies, so it cannot be explained solely by differences in income levels.

When the factors were considered together in one statistical model, supplier concentration and geopolitical distance from China played the largest roles in explaining differences across markets. The geopolitical relationship was also highly statistically significant.

The study does not prove that political alignment itself caused Chinese companies to lower prices. Its results are, however, consistent with exporters directing additional supply towards markets where their relationship with China could support longer-term sales.

Why did Chinese goods not become similarly cheaper in the United States?

The third-market findings differ from earlier research on US imports. Studies of the 2018–19 tariffs found that Chinese exporters did not cut their US selling prices by an amount matching the tariff increases, leaving American importers to bear a substantial share of the additional cost.

The incentives in third markets were different. Chinese producers needed buyers for goods whose sale in the United States had become less profitable. When competing for orders elsewhere, they could accept lower margins to increase the volume sold.

The combination of relative price reductions and higher imported quantities is consistent with an increase in Chinese supply to those destinations. It does not mean that every exporter cut prices: the estimates describe average relationships across a broad range of products and trade routes.

The study covers more than 5,000 product categories

The analysis uses UN Comtrade data for 2017–21 and covers more than 5,000 product categories at the six-digit Harmonized System level. The authors applied a difference-in-differences method to compare price changes for tariff-affected goods with a control group while accounting for other forces influencing trade.

The main price measure is import value divided by the reported quantity. This unit value can change when the mix of higher- and lower-priced varieties within the same category shifts, so it is not an exact transaction price for an individual product.

Reporting units create another complication. Countries record import quantities in measures including kilograms and individual items, and their reporting practices can change from one year to the next. The researchers developed a procedure to standardise the data and limit errors arising from such changes.

They also tested the results on a longer 2015–21 series restricted to products whose classification did not change. For prices, they found no statistically significant divergence in trends before the US tariffs. A separate analysis using Eurostat’s more detailed eight-digit product data confirmed that the EU price effect was temporary.

The findings apply to the US tariff measures introduced in 2018 and 2019. They do not cover the consequences of new tariffs imposed by the United States in 2025–26. Because those newer trade barriers affect many more countries, the authors note that export deflection may operate differently from the mechanism observed in the study period.

Sources

Sofie Grouws, Giulia Lo Forte, Sharon Jeon and Justin Pierce, Trade Deflection: The Spillover Effects of U.S. Tariffs on Import Prices in Bystander Countries, Federal Reserve Board, International Finance Discussion Papers No. 1449, November 2026.

DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2026.1449.

Source data used in the study: UN Comtrade, the U.S. International Trade Commission, Eurostat and the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute financial or any other advice, is general in nature and is not addressed to any specific recipient. Before relying on this information for any purpose, independent advice should be sought. AI may support the editorial team’s work.

Selected categories